Access Control
SteelEngine's policy-based roles, permissions, assignments, and effective-access model.
SteelEngine uses one policy-based access-control system across the dashboard, APIs, realtime collaboration, and platform MCP server. Access is expressed as roles made from catalog permissions and assignments that apply those roles to people or groups at a defined scope.
The access decision
For each protected operation, SteelEngine evaluates:
person or key owner
+ direct and group role assignments
+ role inheritance
+ organization or workspace scope
+ catalog permission for the requested action and target
+ explicit deny rules
+ plan entitlements
+ API-key scope cap, when a key is used
= allow or denyThe visible role name is never the authorization decision. A custom role works exactly like a seeded role because both resolve to catalog permissions.
For example, changing an organization's release repository or upstream branches requires the organization-scoped organization:promotion_repository_configure permission and read access to the managed workspaces. Admins have it by default, and a custom role can receive it without signing-trust administration. Automatic deployment separately requires promotion apply and activation access.
Workspace Source Control access
The workspace:manage_source_control catalog permission grants management of a workspace's repository connection, branch lock, editing policy, and deployment policy. Workspace settings managers can also make those changes. Effective organization assignments can provide the permission across their allowed workspaces; role names alone do not decide access.
Organization-owned GitHub connections have a separate boundary: enabling the integration, connecting or testing repositories, and removing unused connections require organization settings permission. A workspace Source Control grant does not grant organization settings access. The UI explains read-only access, and the server checks permissions again before each mutation. See Source Control setup and the permission catalog.
Deployment application access
Self-hosted Entra workload identities are separate machine principals. An administrator registers the application in an organization and selects supported catalog actions for specific workspaces/workflows, or an automatic policy covering current and future organization workspaces. Local grants remain distinct from Entra's required API application role and from human role assignments. Workloads cannot administer their own bindings.
KB configuration, paused connector configuration, credential use and workspace provider configuration have independent action grants. Existing deployment/environment permissions do not imply these actions, and cleanup requires its own explicit selection. Provider keys remain write-only and connector configuration does not start ingestion; see the workload action matrix.
Start here
- Roles and Permissions explains seeded roles, custom roles, inheritance, and assignments.
- Manage Access covers the People, Groups, Roles, and Activity tabs.
- How Effective Access Is Calculated explains scope, provenance, union, deny precedence, and key caps.
- Permission Catalog Reference lists permission families and stable keys.
- SteelEngine MCP explains how an MCP client's visible operations follow the caller's effective access.
Core terms
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Permission | A catalog action on a resource family, such as workflow:execute |
| Role | A named set of permissions and inherited roles |
| Assignment | A role bound to a person or group at organization or workspace scope |
| Effective access | The result after all applicable assignments and policy constraints are evaluated |
| Provenance | Why access exists: direct, via a group, inherited, or organization-wide |
| Key scope | An additional boundary placed on an API key; it never grants more than the owner has |
Permission groups and roles solve different problems. A group collects people and can receive role assignments. A role collects permissions and can be assigned to a person or group.